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Per Krogh Hansen 
(Kolding) 
 
Autofiction and Authorial Unreliable Narration 
 
 
In recent years, the concept of “the unreliable narrator” has been among 
the most debated within narrative theory. In the wake of a series of 
provocative articles from the late 1990s by Ansgar Nünning (Nünning 
1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999), questions have been asked again and again 
regarding on what basis we determine whether a narrator is unreliable and 
how broad the scope of the concept is. Is the presence of an unreliable 
narrator in a given text the result of an author’s intentional decision, or is 
narratorial unreliability a historically variable reader response to textual 
inconsistencies and/or changing cultural norms? Does the concept belong 
exclusively to fiction, or does it make sense to approach factual or “real” 
narrators with the same concepts we encounter in fictional narrators?  
In this article
1
 I will address these questions with reference to the 
genre of “autofiction” (a genre parallel to or a sub-genre of 
autobiography) with special attention to the Norwegian author Karl Ove 
Knausgård’s six-volume novel Min kamp (2009–2011). I want, on the one 
hand, to discuss how autofiction makes itself vulnerable to narratorial 
unreliability due to the complex truth status of the told and, on the other 
hand, to use this genre to question the concept of unreliable narrator in 
rhetorical criticism as dependent on an intentional act by an (implied) 
author. This is not to say, however, that unreliable narration cannot be a 
narrative technique deliberately used by an author in the creative act of 
novel writing, but that by using the concept exclusively in relation to this 
phenomenon, we lose sight of important alternative (but comparable) 
versions. Among these is the kind of unreliability we can encounter in 
autofiction. 
  
                                                     
1  I would like to thank Professor James Phelan (Ohio) for his valuable comments on an 
earlier draft of this article. 
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1. The Real Fiction of the Self 
 
When Serge Doubrovsky coined the term “autofiction” in relation to his 
1977 novel Fils, he defined it, rather paradoxically, as “Fiction, of strictly 
real events and facts.”2  
Doubrovsky’s work was inspiringly provoked by the fact that Philippe 
Lejeune, in his influential 1975 study Le pacte autobiographique, failed 
to leave room for blending novelistic fictional writing and factual 
autobiography. Lejeune defined autobiography as  
 
a retrospective prose narrative produced by a real person concerning his own 
existence, focusing on his individual life, in particular on the development of 
his personality. (Lejeune 1989 [1975], 4) 
 
Lejeune stated that if a reader was confronted with a text where author, 
narrator and protagonist were the same, he or she would not accept 
counterfactual events or incidents as a matter of fiction. “False” 
information in autobiographical writing, Lejeune claimed, would instead 
be related to “the order of lying” (“l’ordre du mesonge”).  
Doubrovsky broke this dogma two years after Lejeune’s study when 
he published the novel Fils and proclaimed a new genre: autofiction. For 
Doubrovsky, it was characteristic of this new genre that it required 
homonymy between its author, narrator and character and that it played 
on the generic ambiguity of its contradictory pact: on the one hand, the 
                                                     
2  Doubrovsky coined the term on the back cover of the novel, where he wrote: 
“Autobiographie ? Non, c’est un privilège réservé aux importants de ce monde, au soir 
de leur vie, et dans un beau style. Fiction, d’évènements et de faits strictement réels ; 
si l’on veut autofiction, d’avoir confié le langage d’une aventure à l’aventure d’un 
langage en liberté, hors sagesse et hors syntaxe du roman, traditionnel ou nouveau. 
Rencontres, fils de mots, allitérations, assonances, dissonances, écriture d’avant ou 
d’après littérature, concrète, comme on dit musique.” (Doubrovsky 1977) 
   “Autobiography? No, that is a privilege reserved for the important persons of 
this world, in the evening of their lives, and in a beautiful style. Fiction, of strictly real 
events and facts, autofiction if you will; to have given the language of an adventure to 
the adventure of a language in freedom, without wisdom and outside the syntax of the 
novel syntax, traditional or new. Interactions, threads of words, alliterations, 
assonances, dissonances, writing before or after literature, concrete, as they say 
music.” (translation mine) 
Today, the term is included in French dictionaries, and in Canada it is widely 
used as a genre conception, printed on the cover of novels. 
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work is claimed to be absolutely referential and factual; on the other, it is 
claimed to be a novel, that is: fiction.   
The result is not only a contradictory pact but what Poul Behrendt 
(2006) has labeled a “double contract.” On the one hand, the text is 
subject to the rules governing our social and cultural interactions, that is, 
where people have real names and responsibilities, where (at least in our 
part of the world) there is freedom of speech, but also laws protecting us 
from defamation, etc. On the other hand, the text also relates to the 
communicative system of fiction, where reader and author have agreed 
that exceptions exist. Here, the distinction between lying and truth is 
disregarded: ideas and beliefs can be expressed, even if they are 
counterfactual, as contributions to the ongoing negotiation of the 
constitution of our culture and “reality.” 
Here is not the time and place to follow up on the development of the 
concept suggested by Doubrovsky in detail, since it has been scrutinized 
and developed by several since then—most importantly perhaps by 
Gérard Genette in his Fiction and Diction (1993 [1991]). Genette 
suggested that all cases in which an author of fiction includes his own 
person (or a character with the same name as the author) in his fictional 
story should be considered autofiction. If so, works like Cervantes’ Don 
Quixote (1605–1615) and Dante’s The Divine Comedy (1555) would be 
included in the category. But as it has been noted, Genette thereby 
disregarded the second part of Doubrovsky’s characterization, namely 
that the work has to play on the generic ambiguity that comes out of the 
claim of absolute referentiality and absolute fictionality at one and the 
same time. Illustrated with another example: when in City of Glass 
(1985), the first part of Paul Auster’s New York trilogy, a character with 
the name “Paul Auster” appears and is furthermore presented as an author 
living in New York in an environment that reminds us of the real Paul 
Auster’s surroundings, it is less an autofictional than a metafictional 
strategy that is being implemented. The intention is not to tell the story of 
Paul Auster in fictional terms, but rather to enter a mode comparable to 
romantic irony. 
What autofiction does is quite radical in the sense that instead of 
demarcating fiction from reality it blurs the border. This can be 
accomplished by promoting a picture of the authorial self which confirms, 
negates, transforms or plays with the public understanding of this self. 
Such is the case of Bret Easton Ellis’s Lunar Park (2005), where the 
author mixes known public events and incidents from his real life with 
counterfactual and even paranormal events and incidents. The blur 
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between fiction and reality can also result from using the novel form and 
the narrative techniques related to this form to investigate and depict the 
history of the author’s own self. This was what J. M. Coetzee did in the 
three volumes of autofictional memoirs—Boyhood (1997), Youth (2002) 
and Summertime (2009)—when he chose to let the first two volumes be 
told heterodiegetically in third-person narration and the third to take the 
form of a fictitious biographer’s interviews with five factual people from 
Coetzee’s past. Coetzee himself is claimed to be dead in the novel, and 
his voice only appears through a number of third-person fragments of the 
kind the reader already knows from the first two volumes. But even 
though no one would question that the trilogy most certainly is written in 
fictional terms and therefore cannot be understood literally, the books are 
also understood to be about Coetzee’s own life. In this perspective, 
autofiction pushes what is a general paradoxical characteristic of 
practically all storytelling, namely that stories tell the (or some) truth, 
even though what they are telling might not have happened. 
It is therefore also evident that we cannot always rely on the factuality 
of the story being told by the author. But can we approach this authorial 
unreliability in terms of unreliable narration? 
 
2. Factual Unreliable Narration? 
 
It has been claimed that only in fictional narrative can we have true cases 
of unreliable narration. The argument goes that narrative unreliability 
depends on, if not difference, then at least on distance between narrator 
and authorial agent. In her essay on discordant narration, Dorrit Cohn 
claims  
 
that the diagnosis of ‘discordance’ can apply only to a fictional narrative, not 
to the kind of storytelling (oral or written) that presumes to refer to real facts: 
though we often apply the term ‘unreliable’ to voices we regard as wrong-
headed in non-fictional works (historical, journalistic, biographical, or 
autobiographical), the narrator of such works is the author, the author is the 
narrator, so that we cannot attribute to them a significance that differs from 
the one they explicitly proclaim. (Cohn 2000, 307) 
 
This assumption was challenged by James Phelan in the chapter from 
Living to Tell About It on Frank McCourt’s memoir novel Angela’s 
Ashes: A Memoir (1996).  
Phelan demonstrates how McCourt has “built his narrative on the 
foundation of unreliability and the virtual absence of reflection in his 
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authorial voice.” McCourt’s “trick” is, as Phelan writes, to conceive 
“memoir,” not as an art of direct telling from author to audience, but as an  
 
art of indirection. Rather than speaking in his own voice at the time of the 
telling, McCourt uses the historical present and speaks in the voice of his 
former self […] at the time of the action. (Phelan 2005, 67) 
 
What makes the narratorial unreliability possible in McCourt’s case is that 
he uses what Phelan recognizes as a “nonstandard technique” for his 
autobiographical purpose when he “re-invents” his childhood-persona’s 
perspective on the incidents. This technique is, on the other hand, a 
standard novelistic, fictionalizing technique: McCourt-the-Author has 
given the voice and the perspective to a less experienced narrator, Frankie 
(McCourt-the-boy-character), and even lets him tell from the moment of 
the action that is in the first person and in the present tense. Hereby the 
difference or distance claimed by Cohn as a necessity for the formation of 
an unreliable narrator is reinstated.  
We might therefore also conclude that the extended use of this 
fictionalizing technique relates McCourt’s memoir-novel to the genre of 
autofiction more than it does to autobiography proper. Angela’s Ashes is 
“[f]iction, of strictly real events and facts,” and it suggests homonymy 
between author, narrator and character, although this homonymy cannot 
be considered absolute: it is nominal and personal, but not temporal. 
Furthermore, it plays on the generic ambiguity of what Doubrovsky called 
autofiction’s “contradictory pact”: on the one hand, the work claims to be 
absolutely referential and factual; on the other, it makes extended use of a 
standard novelistic technique and therefore relates to fiction, too, at least 
in Richard Walsh’s understanding of fictionality as a rhetorical rather than 
an ontological quality. Fictionality should not, in this perspective, “be 
equated simply with ‘fiction,’ as a category or genre of narrative: it is a 
communicative strategy, and as such it is apparent on some scale within 
many nonfictional narratives” (Walsh 2007, 7). 
But what would the result be if one’s attention were directed toward a 
work that is not composed with the same obvious distance between the 
authorial I, the narratorial I and the character I? If we were to follow 
Phelan’s line of argument, where unreliable narration is defined as 
narration “in which the narrator’s reporting, reading (or interpreting), 
and/or regarding (or evaluating) are not in accord with the implied 
author’s,” (Phelan 2005, 219) then it is quite unlikely that the narrator 
would be unreliable in such a case, since the necessary distance between 
6 Per Krogh Hansen 
the subject positions is eliminated from the very outset. The question, 
then, is whether Phelan’s exclusion would be correct—or whether it is the 
result of too narrow a conception of unreliable narration. 
 
3. A Norwegian’s Struggle with his Past and Present 
 
That it is the latter which is the case I will try to demonstrate by looking 
at an example of autofiction which makes us consider the reliability of the 
narrator without seeking recourse to the concept of the implied author. 
The example is the Norwegian author Karl Ove Knausgård’s six-volume 
autofictional novel Min kamp, meaning My Struggle.
3
  
My Struggle is among the greatest literary sensations in Scandinavia in 
decades. Not only because it has been a huge sales success, but also 
because the publication of the six volumes has been accompanied by a 
heated debate about the use of autobiographical elements in fiction, and 
vice versa. In the six books, Knausgård gives a detailed description of his 
life from the day he was born until the moment he types the final sentence 
of the manuscript of volume 6, taking into account the reception of the 
first volumes of the project and the effect it has had on himself and his 
relationships. Knausgård tells the story in the first person and from the 
position of the writing situation, the first and the last volumes in particular 
containing long essayistic passages reflecting on life, death, art and 
literature. In long sections he changes the focalization and even the 
narrative tense from past to historical present, so that it isn’t the narrating 
I’s but the experiencing I’s (Karl Ove’s) perspective we are confronted 
with. In these chapters there are numerous examples of the kind of 
unreliability Phelan focused on in McCourt’s case, with the difference, 
however, that unreliability is established here due to the distance between 
a diegetic narrator and a fallible filter. 
But these examples are less interesting in the present perspective. It is 
more interesting that there are aspects of the work which raise doubts 
about and even undermine the author-narrator’s reliability.  
                                                     
3  The first volumes have been published in several languages including German, 
English and French. Due to the obvious allusion to Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf (an 
issue to which attention is given in the sixth volume of the series), the books have 
appeared under other titles than in Scandinavia. The first volume is called Sterben 
(2011) in German, La Mort d’un père (2012) in French and A Death in the Family 
(2012) in English. In the latter case, the series has been called My Struggle. In the 
following pages I will refer to the series name.  
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In volume two, in the midst of a very detailed retelling of a long 
conversation during a dinner party at a restaurant, Karl Ove and his friend 
Geir agree upon the fact that Karl Ove has always had an extremely bad 
memory. Due to the frame, the statement becomes a variant of 
Epimenides’ paradox: “All Cretans are liars.” An author giving a 
hyperdetailed account of a long-past situation cannot in the same situation 
claim to have a bad memory. The impact of this inconsistency is quite 
remarkable. The conversation between Geir and Karl Ove is on a very 
highbrow intellectual level of almost Socratic-dialogic dimensions, 
focusing on, among other things, the personal costs connected with “the 
authorial call,” etc. But the remark concerning Karl Ove’s weak memory 
makes the reader speculate whether the whole dialogue isn’t more a 
matter of the authorial I’s creative attempt to put himself in a better light, 
due to the decisions regarding family life and relationships he has had to 
make to pursue his career as an author. We begin speculating whether 
Knausgård-the-author’s reporting is reliable.  
Another example: over the course of the six volumes, Knausgård 
returns to some of the significant incidents in his life. Among these is his 
complicated relationship to his tyrannical and choleric father who died of 
alcohol abuse ten years prior to the time of writing. The last period of the 
father’s life, as it was experienced by Karl Ove, is focused on in both the 
first and the last volumes. But in the latter case, the description is much 
more downtoned than in the former. And where Karl Ove and his older 
brother Yngve were pretty much alone in cleaning up the mess after the 
father in the first volume, they receive attention and help from an uncle 
and aunt in volume 5. Both descriptions focalize the incidents through the 
experiencing I, but it seems as if the narrating I—the author—through the 
process of writing the novel, develops his understanding of the story as it 
is told, a contradiction that exposes a dynamic unreliability regarding 
values and judgments. In volume 6, Knausgård receives an angry letter 
from his uncle (his father’s brother) in which the author’s version of the 
incidents in relation to the father’s death is being questioned with 
reference to supposed hard evidence. And even though Knausgård 
becomes aware that there might be flaws and misjudgments in his former 
retelling of the incidents, he is not abandoning it. As he says to a 
prosecutor in an imagined trial: “This is how I remember it” (volume 6, 
303; translation mine). But as we (and he himself) know: he has an 
extremely bad memory. 
The death of the father is not the only example of this kind of 
unreliability. In volume 1 we are told that Knausgård spent four years 
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with a girl he didn’t love; but when the relationship is described for us in 
the fifth volume, it most certainly seems characterized by love. Again: the 
authorial perspective on and understanding of the incidents has taken 
over, and the result is that our natural urge to rely on the authorial voice 
of the narrative is challenged. Where our expectation with regard to the 
authorial narrative agent is that it is stable and sanctions the norms and 
values of the storyworld, we are instead engaging with inconsistencies, 
and the result for our reading is that we redirect our attention from the 
told toward the teller and thus see the misrepresentations and 
inconsistencies as an expression of character traits and unreliable 
narration. In that sense, Knausgård is, either intentionally or 
unintentionally, flouting the assumption of a stable author. In the 
beginning, we greet the representation as reliable. But as the telling and 
retelling progress, we start having second thoughts, just as Knausgård 
himself does in the sixth volume, when (as pointed out above) he refers to 
memory instead of fact.  
The examples commented on so far are all intra- or internarrational 
insofar as the effect of unreliability is a result of contradictions within the 
narrator’s discourse or between his discourse and the differing perspective 
of others (e.g., his uncle’s) perspective on the same incidents.  
But there are also examples of extratextual circumstances influencing 
the author-narrator’s reliability.4 Even though the books were published 
as “novels”, Knausgård claimed that everything he told was true. All 
material had been presented to the persons concerned, and only a few 
names were changed at their request.  
Everything in this work is depicted with an attention to detail that 
marks the work as a fictional recreation of the past: no one can remember 
their past as clearly and elaborately as Knausgård does. And even though 
we as readers might accept the level of detail, bearing in mind that this is 
also a work of fiction, the authenticity is punctured from inside the 
storyworld by the aforementioned unreliability signals.  
Due to the work’s claim to factuality, moreover, it was also punctured 
from the outside by the persons and family members depicted. Several felt 
exposed and misrepresented and expressed their displeasure and 
disappointment through the media. Fourteen family members even 
                                                     
4  The concepts intranarrational, internarrational and extratextual unreliability belong, 
together with intertextual unreliability, to a taxonomy of different ways of 
signaling/detecting unreliable narration. For further detail, see Hansen (2005, 2007, 
2009). 
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announced that they wanted to bring Knausgård to trial for his “Judas 
literature.”5  
Now, Lejeune claimed that when an author writes in his own name, he 
signs an autobiographical pact in which everything stated is to be 
considered true. If something turns out to be false, it is not a matter of 
fictionalization but, as quoted earlier, relates to the “order of lying.” This 
rather strict understanding of autobiography’s truth value has been revised 
in later conceptions of the genre. As Phelan notes, autobiographical 
theory has repeatedly shown that “subjective truth is far more important 
to memoir than literal truth […] because it is crucial to the 
autobiographer’s ability to give shape and meaning to experience” (2005, 
73). But as he also remarks, subjective “truth must also be accountable to 
some extent to facts, people, and events that have an existence 
independent of the autobiographer’s perception” (73). 
With reference to Lejeune’s initial distinction, it can be observed that a 
radical subjective recounting of the story jeopardizes the author’s 
reliability and makes us, the readers, react in the same way as when we 
get suspicious about a narrator’s account in fictional narrative: we read 
with precaution and look beyond the authorial representation of the facts; 
we try to figure out the true facts of the case and use our observations to 
construct a critical picture of the authorial self about which we make 
ethical judgments. We might even press charges against this self due to 
the fact that autobiography belongs to the system of factual 
communication that is restricted by responsibilities and protection against 
defamation.  
It is also in this respect that we find the main source of the difference 
between the everyday use of the concept of unreliability and its use within 
the context of fictional narrative: where the two forms of unreliability 
both invoke the reader’s ethical judgment, only the latter opens up for an 
esthetic judgment.  
Autofiction blurs this distinction. Insofar as Knausgård’s work is also 
claimed to be fiction, the system of factual cultural interaction and 
communication is partly suspended, and instead the rules governing 
fiction takes over: whatever is depicted is fictionalized, and thus a 
simulated reality is told from a given perspective. Considered an author of 
a work of fiction, Knausgård cannot be blamed for the misrepresentation 
                                                     
5  Uncle Gunnar (which isn’t his real name) was among the most critical voices to the 
project, notably in a commentary published in the newspaper Fædrelandsvennen (cf. 
Kristensen 2011). Knausgård’s estranged ex-wife, Tonje Aursland, also retorted in 
October 2010 in a radio documentary broadcast on NRK.   
10 Per Krogh Hansen 
of persons and events or for his exaggerated remembrance of details. 
Under the auspices of novelistic fiction, this kind of re-creational 
depiction of the past is expected and allowed. 
This, of course, also has significance for the reader’s approach to the 
authorial self. Due to the many misrepresentations in Knausgård’s 
narrative, the ethical judgments passed on both the actions of the author 
and the characters and the critical and questionable aspects of the author’s 
telling are accompanied by esthetic judgments. The narrative is not read 
as an author’s telling about his past, but as a refiguration of that past. 
By making himself the author, the narrator and the protagonist of his 
work and at the same time claiming the storyworld to be in accordance 
with reality, Knausgård’s result is more or less doomed to be an act of 
unreliable narration. Reliability is dependent on a perspective that can tell 
the truth. This is why, on a general level, it makes sense to speak of 
fictional truth, insofar as narrative fiction is the creation of a storyworld 
from a given perspective. But reality as such does not support one truth 
alone. Truth in reality is perpetually being renegotiated. When Knausgård 
claims that he tells the truth, but does it within the framework of fiction, 
he suspends the negotiable nature of factual truth. By doing so, he is both 
hit and saved by what we could call the “kernel paradox” of autofiction: 
he claims that what he tells is true, thus opening up the possibility of 
negotiation, while at the same time claiming that what he says is fiction, 
authorizing the truth value of the told. It is in this tension between author 
and narrator that Knausgård’s unreliability comes into being. More 
generally, autofiction as a genre must at the very least be suspected of 
extratextual unreliability.  
 
4. Auto-Mocking and Self-Deception 
 
From the perspective of unreliable narration as narration “in which the 
narrator’s reporting, reading (or interpreting), and/or regarding (or 
evaluating) are not in accord with the implied author’s” (Phelan 2005, 
219), autofictional authorial unreliability of the kind we find in 
Knausgård’s novels will clearly fall outside the definition. We could 
therefore choose to invent a new term to cope with these deviant cases.
6
 
But insofar as there are quite a few common aspects between the two 
                                                     
6  Phelan (2011) has suggested that we should distinguish between unreliable and 
deficient narration, the latter covering an example such as the one I have discussed 
here. 
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sorts of unreliability, I would like to avoid throwing yet another narrative 
term on the heap of narratological concepts and models. Let me instead 
close this article by considering whether room can be found within the 
standard conception that will allow us to accommodate narrative works 
such as Knausgård’s. 
The concepts that serve as the toolbox we label “narratology” come 
from a great variety of disciplines and discourses and are brought to 
foreign areas thanks to the fact that someone has found an item that lacks 
description but shares significant aspects with another item that has 
already been described. The reason for this travelling applicability is the 
fact that narrative is a transtextual, transgeneric and transmedial 
phenomenon. Applying general narrative conceps developed in one 
context to comparable items in another context gives us the added 
advantage of providing our analysis with considering whether the 
conception has been biased by the fact that it is formulated within a 
framework of one genre, mediality or communicational mode.  
Scholars from literary studies in particular have provided narratology 
with a nearly endless series of useful concepts for the transmedial and 
transdisciplinary study of narrative. But they have also quite often made 
themselves guilty of making general claims as to what narrative is and 
does, whereas what they are actually describing are specific features for 
prose fiction, not narrative in general. 
The concepts of unreliable narrator and unreliable narration have 
travelled between genres and modalities ever since Wayne Booth coined 
the term more than fifty years ago in his study of the rhetoric of novelistic 
narrative fiction. Initially, at least, he did not consider whether the 
concept was of general relevance or limited to literary fiction. Even so, it 
seems that Booth did have a vague idea that there was more to the story 
than he told.  
Booth has often been blamed for the inconsistency of his initial 
formulation: 
 
For lack of better terms, I have called a narrator reliable when he speaks for 
or acts in accordance with the norms of the work (which is to say, the implied 
author’s norms), unreliable when he does not. (Booth 1991 [1961/83]: 158–
159) 
 
All discussions of the concept since then have their basis in differences of 
accentuation in this definition. Rhetoricians working on literary narrative 
have focused on the parenthetically mentioned authorial agent, 
12 Per Krogh Hansen 
intentionality and normativity (understood as ethics) whereas more 
semiotically oriented approaches have highlighted the lack of accordance 
between the narrator’s representation of the storyworld and the actual 
constitution of it. One might claim that the former has developed the 
Boothian concept with respect to the fact that he was working with 
literary, fictional narrative, whereas the latter have tried to include it in 
more transdisciplinary approaches.  
If we can agree that the concept has proven its value as a traveling 
concept, I think we owe it ourselves to reconsider Booth’s definition and 
liberate the “narrative/narratological” part of the concept from the literary 
part.  
By focusing on unreliabilty in Knausgård’s autofictional case, it is 
clear that the implied author component is not a necessary part of the 
unreliable narrator machinery. Rather, it is a concept that proves helpful 
in the distinct cases of unreliable narration in which it is used as technique 
for what Phelan calls “indirection.” This, we could claim, is a feature 
related to fiction, a matter of fictionality, and thus important to study in 
the study of narrative fiction.  
With regard to the reliability of the narrator, seeking explanatory 
recourse in the implied author is a matter of framing. What relates 
unreliable narrators across the fact/fiction distinction, across genres and 
modalities, is that they do not speak or act in accordance with the norms, 
values or facts of the storyworld. As discussed above, it is characteristic 
for fictional storyworlds that their constitution can be authorized by an 
authorial agent. In factual narratives, by contrast, author and narrator are 
often (as Cohn stated) the same. This, however, does not rule out the 
possibility of unreliability. The storyworld is simply not governed by an 
implied author in these cases, but rather by sensus communis to the extent 
that readers have a stake in it. 
Autofiction is a special case, since it blurs the borders between author, 
narrator and character as well as between fact and fiction. In itself, it is an 
extremely unreliable genre, and it can thus take either the form of 
intentional auto-mocking, as in McCourt’s example, or that of seemingly 
unintentional self-deception, as in Knausgård’s. So perhaps, after all, 
there is still room and a need for new conceptions and distinctions.  
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